We analyze how private learning in a class of games with common stochastic payoffs affects the form of equilibria, and how properties such as player welfare and the extent of strategic miscoordination relate across monotone and non-monotone equilibria. Researchers typically focus on monotone equilibria. We provide conditions under which non-monotone equilibria also exist, where players attempt to coordinate to obtain the stochastic payoff whenever signals are in a bounded interval. In bounded interval equilibria (BIE), an endogenous fear of miscoordination discourages players from coordinating to obtain the stochastic payoff when their signals suggest coordination is most beneficial. In contrast to monotone equilibria, expected payoffs from successful coordination in BIE are lower than the ex-ante expected payoff from ignoring signals and always trying to coordinate to obtain the stochastic payoff. We show that BIE only exist when, absent private information, the game would be a coordination game.
Introduction
In this paper, we analyze how private learning in a class of coordination games with common stochastic payoffs affects the nature and structure of equilibria, and how properties such as player welfare and the extent of strategic miscoordination are related across the monotone and non-monotone equilibria that may result. We analyze the game in Figure 1 , where h, l and w are known parameters with h > l, but θ is an unknown common stochastic payoff drawn from a distribution with support R, and players receive noisy private signals about θ. The game captures some key aspects of strategic interactions in a variety of economic and political settings. For example, it describes:
• A coup game between officers who must decide whether to mount a coup based on private signals about the successful coup payoff θ, where the coup only succeeds if both officers act. If one officer acts, the coup fails, and the disloyal officer is punished. The setting captures the possibilities that, when a coup fails, the loyal officer's payoff can fall (w < h) if the ruler increases surveillance of the military or reduces its budget to weaken it; or it can rise (w > h) when a loyal officer who informs the ruler is rewarded, or the ruler raises the military budget to keep officers happy.
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• A technology adoption game in which firms must decide whether to stick to an existing platform or to pursue a new network/platform investment (with uncertain value) that 1 Shadmehr and Bernhardt (2011) analyze monotone equilibria in a revolution setting in which citizens receive signals about the uncertain revolution payoffs (θ), and a regime punishes a leader of a failed revolt. They impose w = h, and use the special properties of the additive normal signal structure to establish the existence of a threshold µ * > 0 such that two symmetric finite-cutoff equilibria exist if µ < µ * , but no such equilibrium exists if µ > µ * . Bueno de Mesquita (2014) also uses a normal-noise signal structure in his study of the consequences of the "location of uncertainty" and limit dominance (one-sided vs. two-sided), proving that zero or two finite-cutoff equilibria generically exist. It is not clear which properties drive these findings.
only pays off if broadly adopted.
• A "relationship game" in which individuals, who know the value of their relationships with their current partners, receive signals about their payoffs if they break those relationships to form a new one together (action 1), where h > l reflects that breaking an existing relationship is costly if a potential partner does not reciprocate.
• A tariff war, in which countries choosing between high tariffs and free trade, where the countries know the payoffs from high tariffs, but receive signals about the uncertain political economy payoffs of free trade.
In these settings, the noisy signals typically leave players very uncertain about whether the actual payoffs from "successful" coordination on action 1 exceed the sure payoffs from coordinating on action 0, and the other player's equilibrium action will contain material information about θ-players face both information aggregation and miscoordination concerns. Were θ public information, then when θ ≥ w, equilibrium imposes no restrictions on how players coordinate: if a player believes the other will take action 1, then she will take action 1 to receive θ; but if she believes that the other will take action 0, the miscoordination cost µ ≡ h−l > 0 causes her to take action 0, expecting only to receive h. Concerns about strategic miscoordination can induce players to take action 0, no matter how high θ is. However, in most strategic settings, rather than θ being public information, players instead receive private noisy signals, leaving substantial uncertainty about its value. In such settings, we ask: what forms can equilibria take, and how do the properties of these equilibria relate to each other?
Researchers typically focus on equilibria in finite-cutoff strategies in which a player takes action 0 when her signal about θ is below some critical cutoff, but takes action 1 when the signal is above. We show that such equilibria exist if and only if µ is sufficiently small.
3 We then provide conditions under which non-monotone equilibria also exist in which each player takes action 1 if and only if her signal is in a bounded interval. In these bounded interval equilibria (BIE), an endogenous fear of miscoordination discourages players from coordinating on action 1 to obtain θ exactly when their signals suggest that coordination is most beneficial. We 2 Chassang and Padró i Miquel (2010) analyze a related setting in which signal noise is vanishingly small, so that only miscoordination concerns are present, and a unique monotone equilibrium obtains.
3 A coordination failure equilibrium in which both players always take action 0 always exists.
prove that bounded interval equilibria exist only when finite-cutoff equilibria exist, and that if, following a signal, a player takes action 1 in a bounded interval equilibrium, then she also does so in the largest finite-cutoff equilibrium. Moreover, bounded interval equilibria only exist if w < E[θ]-there must be sufficient potential surplus from coordinating on action 1.
Thus, for bounded interval equilibria to exist, absent private information, the game must be a coordination game with both h > l and E[θ] > w. This means that in our private information setting, in any bounded interval equilibrium, players face an expected risk of miscoordination even when taking the "safe" action 0: unconditionally, were the other player to always take action 1, it must be better to always take action 1 than to always take action 0. We then highlight the bad welfare properties of bounded interval equilibria, showing that while in any finite-cutoff equilibrium, a player's ex-ante expected payoff from successfully coordinating on action 1 always exceeds E[θ], in any bounded interval equilibria, the opposite must hold.
We first analyze monotone equilibria. Given an affiliation assumption on signal structures plus some tail restrictions on distributions, we show that equilibria in finite-cutoff strategies exist if and only if the miscoordination cost µ is not too high. We then investigate the number of finite-cutoff equilibria that can exist. Previous results based on additive normal noise signal structures suggest that generically either zero or two finite-cutoff equilibria exist-see footnote 1. We show that this result does not generalize. For example, with an additive logistic noise signal structure, a unique finite-cutoff equilibrium obtains when µ is small.
We then ask whether and when more limited coordination can emerge in equilibrium.
We search for equilibria in bounded interval strategies (BIS) in which players take action 1 whenever their signals about the common coordination payoff are high, but not too high, i.e., whenever signals are inside a bounded interval (k L , k R ). In such bounded interval equilibria (BIE), 4 a self-fulfilling fear of miscoordination causes players not to take action 1 precisely when their signals suggest that the payoff from coordinating on action 1 is highest.
We first use Karlin's variation diminishing theorem to show that when the conditional pdf of signals given θ is totally positive of order three (T P 3 ), then the best response to a BIS is either a BIS or always to take action 0. We next establish necessary and sufficient conditions for an arbitrary BIS (k L , k R ) to be supported as an equilibrium for some set of primitive payoff parameters, {w, µ}: player indifference at k L and k R means that they must be more likely to succeed in coordinating on action 1 following signal k L than signal k R , since the expected payoff from successful coordination is higher given k R .
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We show that if a bounded interval equilibrium (BIE) exists, then so does a finite-cutoff equilibrium. Moreover, any BIE must be "contained" in the largest monotone equilibriumletting k be the cutoff for the monotone equilibrium in which players take action 1 the most, we establish that k < k L , i.e., players are strictly more likely to take action 1 in the k equilibrium. Intuitively, the finite-cutoff k equilibrium offers the promise of a better upside from coordination-the other player may have a really high signal-and miscoordination is less likely, making it worthwhile to risk trying to coordinate on action 1 following a less promising signal. We then show that if multiple finite-cutoff equilibria exist, andk is the cutoff for the smallest one, then k L <k: miscoordination is more likely following signalk in the monotone equilibrium than it is following signal k L in the BIE; but the potentially high payoff if the other player has an especially high signal makes it worthwhile.
6
To illustrate the extent to which the endogenously-generated fear of miscoordination must necessarily be severe in a BIE, we specialize to the classical additive normal noise signal struc-
Thus, on average, in a BIE, a player seeks to coordinate 5 Chen and Suen (2015) investigate a game with model uncertainty where individuals update from their incomes about whether a revolution would lead to an improved distribution of incomes. Equilibria take a bounded interval form, because wealthy individuals do not want to have their income re-allocated and hence have dominant strategies not to revolt; and poor individuals are pessimistic about the prospect that an improved distribution of incomes would result (and revolution is costly). From a technical perspective, Chen and Suen prove the existence of bounded interval equilibria using Tarski's fixed point theorem. In contrast to our setting, in their setting, monotone equilibria do not exist (reflecting that the very poor and very rich never revolt), the best response to a BIS is always a BIS, the best response to a larger BIS is also a larger BIS (best responses are monotone with respect to set inclusion order), and one can construct a natural complete lattice consisting of non-degenerate intervals that the best response correspondence maps into itself. Therefore, Tarski's theorem applies. However, in our setting, the best response to a BIS can be a monotone strategy. Moreover, when BIS is sufficiently large (with lower bound above that for the largest monotone equilibria), iterating on best responses can generate consecutively larger BISs (each containing the preceding one, implying a monotone mapping), but one cannot construct a complete lattice because each interation makes the resulting BIS closer to a monotone strategy, as the upper end of the BIS grows without bound. This means that one cannot apply Tarski's theorem, necessitating a completely different approach to establishing the existence of a BIE.
6 Because this game is not supermodular, one cannot invoke the result that the largest and smallest equilibria are monotone (see Van Zandt and Vives (2007) and their literature review). For a method of constructing non-monotone equilibria in dynamic supermodular games, see Balbus, Reffett, and Woźny (2014) .
to receive θ on a very limited set of signals, and the expected fruits of such coordination are low relative to the potential benefits: conditional on coordinating on action 1 and obtaining θ, a player's expected payoff is lower than E[θ] = 0 in any BIE, while it is higher than E [θ] in any finite-cutoff equilibrium. Moreover, we show that for a BIE to exist, w must be less than E[θ]-BIE exist only when, absent private information, we have a coordination game.
We conclude with a discussion of non-monotone equilibria, (a) when stochastic payoffs from coordinating on action 1 are private rather than common values; and (b) in global games that feature two-sided limit dominance (see e.g., Morris and Shin (2003) ).
The Model
Two players A and B must choose between actions 0 and 1. Payoffs are depicted in Figure   1 ; players receive the common stochastic payoff θ if and only if they both take action 1, and payoffs h, l and w are common knowledge, with h > l. We also impose standard additional structure on the tail properties of f (θ, s A , s B ):
Assumption A1 For i, j ∈ {A, B} with i = j:
(a) lim
Assumption A1 implies that lim k→∞ P r(s j > k|s i = k) = 0 and lim
In the Online Appendix, we show that A1 holds with an additive noise signal structure,
, where θ and ν i s are independent normal or logistic random variables.
A pure strategy for player i is a function ρ i mapping her signal s i about θ into an action 7 s i , s j and θ are strictly affiliated if, for all z, z ∈ R 3 , with
, where min and max are defined component-wise (see de Castro (2010) for a review).
choice. That is, ρ i : R → {0, 1}, where ρ i (s i ) = 1 indicates that player i takes action 1, and ρ i (s i ) = 0 indicates that i takes action 0.
Monotone Equilibria
We first analyze monotone strategies, where a player's strategy is (weakly) monotone in her signal. With finite-cutoff strategies, a player j's strategy is summarized by a critical cutoff k j :
Let ∆(s i ; k j ) be player i's expected net payoff from taking action 1 rather than 0, given her signal s i and the other player's cutoff k j . Then,
where µ ≡ h − l > 0 is the net miscoordination cost of taking action 1 when the other player takes action 0. Player i takes action 1 if and only if ∆(
Because the payoff θ from coordinating on action 1 can be very low, the game is not supermodular. When player j reduces her cutoff k j (takes action 1 more), player i is less likely to pay the miscoordination cost, i.e., P r(s j ≤ k j |s i ) µ falls, raising i's incentive to take action 1, creating a force for strategic complements. However, when player j reduces her cutoff k j , player i's expected payoff from successful coordination on action 1, E[θ|s
also falls, reducing her incentive to take action 1, creating a force for strategic substitutes.
Always taking action 1 is never a best response. To see this, first note that if player j always takes action 1, then player i takes action 1 if and only if E[θ|s i ] > w, and A1 implies
Next, note that if, instead, player j adopts a finite-cutoff strategy with cutoff k j , then from equation (1),
takes action 0 if her signal is sufficiently low. Further, since h > l, if player j always takes action 0, then so should player i: always taking action 0 is always an equilibrium. Besides this equilibrium, all other monotone equilibria are in finite-cutoff strategies. Unless stated
otherwise, in what follows, when we write a cutoff strategy, we mean a finite-cutoff strategy.
Lemma 3 in the Appendix establishes that the best response to a finite-cutoff strategy is a unique finite-cutoff strategy. Thus, a pair of finite cutoffs (
Throughout, we focus on symmetric equilibria where
is a (symmetric) cutoff equilibrium if and only if ∆ 1 (k) = 0, where
We say that a cutoff equilibrium is larger when its cutoff is smaller, so that players are more likely to take action 1 in that equilibrium. Proposition 1 characterizes cutoff equilibria.
Proposition 1 There exists a threshold µ * > 0 on miscoordination costs such that a finite-
is either singlepeaked or strictly increasing, then at most one other finite-cutoff equilibrium exists.
Proposition 1 reveals that when the miscoordination cost µ is large, the potential gains from coordinating on action 1 and obtaining θ are swamped by the risk of taking action 1 when the other player takes action 0. One might posit that as µ rises and incentives to take action 1 fall, equilibrium cutoffs could adjust, preserving finite-cutoff equilibria. However, because the expected value of coordinating on action 1 is bounded from above (by A1 (b)), sufficiently high miscoordination costs µ always swamp the possible coordination gains.
The properties of best response curves provide further insights. Let k i (k j ) be player i's unique best response cutoff to player j's cutoff k j . Even were j to always take action 1, player i only takes action 1 when her signal is sufficiently high, i.e., lim
• line, the first crossing must occur from above. Moreover, raising the punishment cost µ or the predatory payoff w makes a player more hesitant to take action 1, i.e., k i (k j ) shifts upward,
, and hence no finite-cutoff equilibrium exists.
When µ is below that threshold, at least one finite-cutoff equilibrium exists.
10 Note that µ * will vary with the primitives describing payoffs and signals of the model.
equilibria. In the Online Appendix, we show that when s i = θ + ν i , (1) if θ and ν i s are independent normal random variables, then ∆(x) is single-peaked for all µ > 0 and w; and (2) if θ, ν
is single-peaked when µ is large enough that w < 1+µ, but is strictly increasing when w ≥ 1+µ. We also provide alternative general sufficient conditions for ∆ 1 (k) to be single-peaked or increasing: (1) P r(s j > k|s i = k) is decreasing and logconcave in k, and (2) 
Let k be the cutoff for the largest finite-cutoff equilibrium, andk be the cutoff for the smallest finite-cutoff equilibrium when multiple equilibria exist. Because raising µ or w shifts
is single-peaked or strictly increasing, increases in µ or w raise k, but reducek: the largest finite-cutoff equilibrium has "natural" comparative statics, but the smallest one has the opposite comparative statics, reflecting that it is locally unstable. 
B}, where θ and ν i s are iid logistic
When µ is small, there is a unique finite-cutoff equilibrium. Parameters: w = −1.5.
When ∆ 1 (x) is single-peaked or strictly increasing, the right-tail properties of ∆ 1 (k) determines the number of finite-cutoff equilibria. With an additive normal signal structure, Shadmehr and Bernhardt (2011) show that lim k→∞ ∆ 1 (k) < 0, so either zero or two finitecutoff equilibria exist generically. This result does not generalize. For example, as Figure   2 illustrates, with an additive logistic noise signal structure, when µ is small, lim k→∞ ∆ 1 (k) can be positive, implying a unique finite-cutoff equilibrium-see the Online Appendix.
Bounded Interval Equilibria
We next investigate when other types of equilibria can exist. In particular, we determine when an endogenously-generated fear of miscoordination can give rise to equilibria in which players sometimes seek to coordinate on action 1, but fail to do so precisely when their signals suggest that payoffs from successful coordination would be very high. We then relate the properties of monotone and these non-monotone, bounded interval equilibria (BIE), and characterize the primitive parameters for which BIE do and do not exist.
We say that player j adopts the bounded interval strategy (k 
To characterize best responses to a bounded interval strategy (BIS), it helps to link Γ[
Then we can write player i's net expected payoff from taking action 1 given signal s i as
where
, we use Karlin's theorem on the variation diminishing property of totally positive functions (Karlin 1968 , Ch. 1, Theorem 3.1). A function K(x, y) is Totally Positive of order n, T P n , whenever
is totally positive of order n and π(θ) has
has at most r sign changes. We assume that our information structure has the following properties:
Assumption A2 For i, j ∈ {A, B} with i = j, the probability density of s i conditional on θ,
, is totally positive of order three (T P 3 ), and P r(k L < s
We show in an Online Appendix that A2 holds if s i = θ + ν i , where θ and ν i s are independent normal or iid logistic random variables.
11 Given this structure, we use Karlin's theorem to derive the shapes of Γ(
, using equations (4) to (6). This allows us to characterize the best response to a BIS:
Lemma 1 Suppose player j adopts a bounded interval strategy. Then, either player i's best response is a bounded interval strategy, or it is to always take action 0.
We first use logconcavity to show that (i) π(θ; k j L , k j R ) has a unique maximum whenever it is positive, and (ii) when θ increases unboundedly, P r(k L < s i < k R |θ) approaches zero at a rate faster than exponential functions (An 1998) , and hence lim θ→∞ P r(k L < s i < k R |θ)(θ − (w − µ)) = 0. We use these to show that π(θ; k j L , k j R ) has at most two sign changes. We then use the fact that because f (s i |θ) is T P 3 , Karlin's theorem implies that Γ( Throughout, we focus on symmetric BIE. The necessary and sufficient condition for
To find a symmetric BIE, one must solve the system of equations that describe a player's indifference between taking actions 0 and 1 at the cutoffs:
11 Suppose ν i ∼ h. Then, affiliation (T P 2 ) requires h to be log-concave: (h ) 2 ≥ hh . T P 3 involves higher derivatives of h, in particular,
(-9.98,-1.88) 
These equations are only necessary conditions. To show that they are also sufficient, Lemma 2 shows that Γ changes sign at any solution of these equations. Therefore, any solution to these equations describes a BIE:
Figure 3 illustrates an equilibrium in bounded interval strategies. Next, we determine for a given signal structure f (θ, s A , s B ) that satisfies A1 and A2 and an arbitrary bounded interval strategy (k L , k R ), whether there exist primitive payoff parameters {µ, w} that support (k L , k R ) as an equilibrium. Proposition 2 details necessary and sufficient conditions for (k L , k R ) to be an equilibrium for some set of primitives.
Proposition 2 There exist payoff parameters {µ, w} for which (k L , k R ) is an equilibrium
BIS if and only if
To see the necessity, observe that the indifference conditions at the bounds of a symmet-
Rearranging these indifference conditions yields
A player with high signal s i = k R is more optimistic about the expected value of θ than if she sees signal s i = k L . To be indifferent between taking actions 0 and 1 after both signals, she must be more pessimistic about the likelihood of coordinating on θ given s i = k R . Thus,
The indifference conditions also shed light on the primitives that support (k L , k R ) as a BIE.
Rearranging yields a bound on the predatory payoff w:
The intuition is simple: player i is hurt when she takes action 1 rather than action 0 if j takes action 0, receiving l rather than h. Thus, to be willing to take action 1, i must expect to gain from taking action 1 rather than action 0 if j instead takes action 1. This inequality also holds for all s i > k R -were such a player to know that the other agent had a signal s j ∈ (k L , k R ), she would also want to take action 1 for higher signals; but she assigns such a low probability to the event s j ∈ (k L , k R ), and hence such a high probability to miscoordination, that she chooses to take action 0 despite her high signal.
Properties of bounded interval equilibria. To characterize bounded interval equilibria, we next relate BIE and monotone equilibria. We then specialize to the classical additive normal noise signal structure to highlight the surprisingly strong structure that Proposition 2 places on the nature and extent of coordination that can occur in any BIE. Recall that k is the cutoff for the largest finite-cutoff equilibrium, andk is the cutoff for the smallest finite-cutoff equilibrium when there are multiple equilibria.
Proposition 3 If a BIE exists, then finite-cutoff monotone equilibria exist. If (k L , k R ) is a bounded interval equilibrium strategy, then k < k L , i.e., players take action 1 following worse signals in the largest finite-cutoff (k) equilibrium than in any BIE.
If lim k→∞ ∆ 1 (k) < 0 and a BIE exists, then multiple finite-cutoff monotone equilibria exist. If (k L , k R ) is a bounded interval equilibrium strategy, then k L <k, wherek is the cutoff for the smallest finite-cutoff equilibrium.
The intuition comes from a decomposition of Γ[s
13 A player must be indifferent between actions 0 and 1 when his signal just equals the lower cutoff k L of a BIE. Thus, when a player j chooses the cutoff strategy k L instead of a BIS, so that j takes action 1 after receiving all "better signals," player i has more incentive to take action 1 than in the BIE. In particular, where she was indifferent between actions (at s i = k L ) in the BIE, she now strictly prefers to take action 1:
If, in addition, lim k→∞ ∆ 1 (k) < 0, then there are multiple solutions to ∆ 1 (k) = 0, i.e., there are multiple finite-cutoff equilibria. The largest such cutoff,k exceeds k L : this follows since ∆ 1 (k L ) > 0 but ∆ 1 (k) < 0 for k >k. Moreover, because the gains from successful coordination following signalk in the cutoff equilibrium exceed those in the BIE given signal k L , the probability of successful coordination must be lower givenk than k L in the corresponding equilibrium.
Corollary 1 Players are more likely to take action 1 in the largest finite-cutoff equilibrium than in any BIE.
When w > l, players take action 1 too little in the k equilibrium from a welfare perspective (Shadmehr and Bernhardt (2015) ), implying that BIE are welfare dominated.
Additive normal noise signal structure. To illustrate the sharp bite of the necessary
where the second inequality follows from (7). now specialize to the classical additive normal noise signal structure. The key structure that we exploit is that the signals shift the distribution, so that single-peakedness and symmetry are preserved and the dispersions of conditional distributions do not depend on signals.
Suppose s i = θ + ν i , i ∈ {A, B}, where θ and ν i 's are independent with θ ∼ N (0, σ 2 ) and
, and recall that pdf (s j |s i ) ∼ N (bs i , (1 + b)σ 2 ν ). First, observe that when the noise in signals goes to zero, in the limit, P r(
, implying that BIE do not exist. 14 Proposition 4 details the sharp restrictions imposed on possible BIE using the fact that raising s i from k L to k R just shifts the conditional distribution f (s j |s i ) to the right:
is an equilibrium BIS, a player i must be more pessimistic about the likelihood of coordinating on θ given
With an additive normal noise signal structure, this inequality becomes
Inspection of (9) reveals that for it to hold, we must have k L < 0 and |k L | > |k R |.
Corollary 2 Relative to finite-cutoff equilibria, coordination in BIE on action 1 is limited and it is on less promising values: In particular, k < k L < k R < −k, where k < 0 and
The corollary highlights the severity of the endogenously-generated fear of miscoordination after high signals in any BIE. For a BIE to exist, we must have k < k L < 0; and k < 0 implies that in the finite-cutoff equilibrium supporting the most coordination on θ, players seek to coordinate on action 1 for a majority of signals. In contrast, in a BIE, players fail to coordinate following all good signals s i > −k.
, where we use lim σν →0
These results highlight that BIE have particularly bad welfare properties relative to finitecutoff equilibria. In finite-cutoff equilibria, a player's expected payoff, given just her own information and conditional on successfully coordinating on action 1 to obtain θ exceeds E[θ]:
The fact that coordination succeeds only when the other player also has a good signal, s j > k reinforces this. In sharp contrast, in BIE, |k L | > k R and k L < 0 imply that a player's expected payoff, given just her own information and conditional on successfully coordinating on action 1 to obtain θ, is worse than E[θ]:
The fact that coordination only succeeds when the other player also has a signal
further reduces the expected payoff from 'successful' coordination in a BIE.
Because expected payoffs in BIE are lower than those for finite-cutoff equilibria, BIE cease to exist for lower miscoordination costs than for finite-cutoff equilibria:
Corollary 3 Recall that finite-cutoff equilibria exist whenever µ < µ * . There exists a µ * * < µ * such that if µ > µ * * , then no bounded interval equilibrium exists.
Why then do BIE exist and when? Summarizing our previous results, recall that players' indifference at the bounds of an equilibrium BIS (k L , k R ) has two implications. First,
, which Proposition 4 shows for a normal-noise signal structure implies k L < 0 and |k L | > |k R |. These latter results imply
. Combining these results yields:
Corollary 4 A necessary condition for a BIE to exist is w < E[θ] = 0.
Thus, for a BIE to exist, absent any private information, the game must be a coordination game with h > l and E[θ] > w. That is, a player must face a miscoordination risk when taking the 'safe' action 0: unconditionally, were the other player to always take action 1, it must be better to always take action 1 than to always take action 0. The fact that w < E[θ]
is necessary for a BIE to exist highlights that there must be sufficient expected potential surplus from coordinating on action 1 to compensate for the facts that in a BIE, (i) players fail to coordinate on action 1 precisely when the payoff from doing so is expected to be high, thereby foregoing much of the benefits of coordinating on action 1; and (ii) a player is hurt when she tries to coordinate on action 1, but the other player does not.
In many of the economic settings described by the payoffs in Figure 1 , the payoff h from coordinating on action 0 is less than the payoff w from taking action 0 when the other player takes action 1. For example, in an international trade game, the payoff when both countries set high tariffs is less than the payoff from setting a high tariff when the other country lowers its barriers. In such settings, the results in Corollary 4 are reinforced: BIE only exist when the status quo payoff of h (e.g., trade wars) is also low relative to the ex-ante expected benefits of coordinating on action 1 (e.g., free trade)-but the agents nonetheless get the low status quo payoff when signals about coordination are promising.
Discussion
A thorough analysis of non-monotone equilibria in a broader class of games is beyond the scope of our paper. However, it is straightforward to establish that BIE can exist in the private value analogue of our common value coordination setting, in which a player i's expected payoff when both players coordinate on action 1 is given by her signal s i . Indeed, the intuitions and qualitative properties that we have emphasized carry over directly.
One may also wonder if the one-sided limit dominance property 15 of our game is essential for the existence of non-monotone equilibria. Clearly, in games featuring two-sided limit dominance, a bounded interval strategy is never a best response, and hence bounded interval equilibria cannot exist. Still, more complex non-monotone equilibria may exist. To see this, consider the classical private value investment game of Morris and Shin (2003) in Figure 4 , where action 1 corresponds to invest and action 0 corresponds to not invest.
Clearly, no BIE exists because a player always takes action 0 when her signal s i is less than h, and she always takes action 1, when her signal exceeds h + µ. The question is: can slightly 15 A player has a dominant strategy to take action 0 if her signal is low enough, but does not have a dominant strategy if her signal is high: our game features one-sided limit dominance, not two-sided limit dominance. 
To show that such non-monotone equilibria can exist, we construct a non-monotone equilibrium for an additive normal noise signal structure,
In such an equilibrium, players must be indifferent at the cutoffs, k 1 , k 2 and k 3 . Defining
, the indifference conditions are:
In particular, we must have
is supported as an equilibrium by µ = Figure 5 illustrates that, for these parameters, the non-monotone strategy (k 1 , k 2 , k 3 ) = (−5, 0, 5) is the best response to itself, and hence constitutes an equilibrium. 
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: First, we prove a lemma.
Lemma 3
The best response to a finite-cutoff strategy is a unique finite-cutoff strategy.
and by affiliation, both P r(s j > k j |s i ) and E[θ|s
Thus, for every k j , there exists a unique
Now, rewrite equation (2) as
For any k, ∂∆ 1 (k;µ) ∂µ = −(1−P r(s j > k|k)) < 0: raising µ uniformly lowers the curve ∆ 1 (k; µ).
Next, we show that when µ is sufficiently small, ∆ 1 (k) crosses zero at least once; and that when µ is sufficiently large, there is no solution to ∆ 1 (k) = 0. At
and from A1, lim k→±∞ E[θ|s j > k, s i = k] = ±∞. Therefore, for a given w, ∆ 1 (k; µ = 0) crosses zero from below-at a unique point. Thus, from the continuity of ∆ 1 (k; µ) in k and µ, ∆ 1 (k; µ) = 0 has a solution for sufficiently small µ > 0.
Lemma 4 There exists aμ > 0 such that if µ >μ, then ∆ 1 (k) < 0 for all k.
Proof: Consider ∆ 1 (k; µ) from equation (12), where we have made the dependence of ∆ 1 on the parameter µ explicit. First, observe that ∆ 1 (k; µ) is uniformly decreasing in µ: for any k, ∆ 1 (k; µ 1 ) > ∆ 1 (k; µ 2 ) for all µ 2 > µ 1 . Thus, if for some µ =μ, ∆ 1 (k;μ) < 0 for all k, then ∆ 1 (k; µ) < 0 for all µ >μ. Now, suppose that the statement of the lemma is false.
Then, it must be the case that for all µ, there is some k such that ∆ 1 (k; µ) ≥ 0. We seek a contradiction.
From A1 (b), lim k→−∞ E[θ|s j > k, k] = −∞, and hence lim k→−∞ ∆ 1 (k; µ) < 0 for all µ > 0. Recall our premise that, for all µ, there is some k such that ∆ 1 (k; µ) ≥ 0. Thus, because ∆ 1 (k; µ) is continuous in k, there exists a smallest k ∈ R at which ∆ 1 (k; µ) ≥ 0.
Call it k(µ) ∈ R, and observe that k(µ) is weakly increasing in µ.
Because k(µ) is weakly increasing in µ, M (µ) is weakly decreasing in µ and m(µ) is weakly we have ∆ 1 (k; µ) < 0 for all k, a contradiction.
Therefore, there exists a µ * > 0 such that ∆ 1 (k) = 0 has a solution if µ < µ * and it does not have a solution if µ > µ * . It is immediate that when ∆ 1 (k) is either single-peaked or strictly increasing, ∆ 1 (k) = 0 has at most two solutions.
Proof of Lemma 1. We proceed in two steps.
Step 1: We show that π(θ; k j L , k j R ), from equation (5), has at most two sign changes. Ob-
If θ > w − µ, this inequality is equivalent to
. The left-hand side is strictly increasing in θ and the right-hand side is strictly decreasing because g(θ) is logconcave by A2. Thus, they can cross at most once, in which case the intersection identifies a local maximum. Next, observe that [θ−(w−µ)] g(θ) = 0 at θ = w−µ, and lim θ→∞ [θ−(w−µ)] g(θ) = 0 from log-concavity (An 1998, Corollary 1) . Thus, the crossing, indeed, happens exactly once.
has a unique maximum for θ ∈ (w − µ, ∞), and is negative for θ ∈ (−∞, w − µ).
, it inherits the shape, and has at most two sign changes (see Figure 3 ).
Step 2:
Step 1 shows that π(θ; k 
is first negative, then positive, and then negative, which implies a bounded interval strategy.
Proof of Lemma 2:
The "only if" part is immediate from the continuity of
change sign at k L or k R or both. We consider two cases:
Case I: Suppose Γ changes sign at only one of k L and k R . WLOG, suppose Γ changes sign at k R , but not k L . Then k L must be a local maximum (minimum). Adding a small positive (negative) constant to π in equation (6) adds a constant to Γ,
and hence creates k Ll and k Lr at which Γ + changes sign, with k Ll < k L < k Lr < k R . Thus, Γ + changes sign at least three times: at k Ll , k Lr , and k R + R for some small R . But from the proof of Lemma 1, π + has at most two sign changes, which together with the T P 3 property of f (θ|s i ) implies that Γ + has at most two sign changes, which is a contradiction.
Case II: Suppose Γ does not change sign at k L and k R . If k L and k R are both local maxima or both local minima, an argument similar to Case I leads to a contradiction. If one is a local maximum and the other is a local minimum, then there exists a k M with k L < k M < k R at which Γ changes sign. Now apply the argument in Case I with k M instead of k R .
Proof of Proposition
Solving for −w from (4) and using the notation in (3), yields
Rearranging the second equality yields,
.
The left-hand side is positive. Therefore, a necessary condition for the equilibrium to exist is that the right-hand side be positive. Since E[θ|s
. This proves the "only if" part. To prove the "if" part, note that the right-hand side of equation (14) is
, and it does not depend on µ. Thus, there exists a µ > 0 such that this equation holds. Finally, substitute that µ into equation (13). There exists a w that satisfies this equation.
where the last equality follows from equation (2). Footnote 13 shows that (E[θ|s
. This together with lim k→−∞ ∆ 1 (k) < 0 implies that ∆ 1 (k) has at least one solution to the left of k L , and hence finite-cutoff equilibria exist. In addition, if lim k→∞ ∆ 1 (k) < 0, then ∆ 1 (k) must cross the horizontal axis from above at least once, i.e., another finite-cutoff equilibrium exists. Letk be the cutoff for the smallest finite-cutoff equilibrium. Because ∆ 1 (k L ) > 0 and ∆ 1 (k) < 0 for k >k, we must have k L <k.
Proof of Proposition 4: Suppose s i = θ + ν i , i ∈ {A, B}, where θ and ν i 's are independent with θ ∼ N (0, σ 2 ) and
, and note that pdf (s
which holds if and only if
, where we have made the dependence of Γ on µ explicit. Below, we show that when µ < µ * is sufficiently close to µ
Recall equation (15) from the proof of Proposition 3,
where the inequality follows from (7) and affiliation. From the proof of Proposition 1, Shadmehr and Bernhardt 2011, p. 836) , and hence bounded from below, and (ii) from Corollary 2, k < k L < 0, and k R < −k, and hence k L and k R are bounded. Thus, P r(s j > k R |s i = k L ) is bounded away from 0. Combining these results, from (17),
Online Appendix: Examples
First, we present examples of signal structures that satisfy our assumptions. Then, we provide sufficient conditions (for signal structures) under which ∆ 1 (k) is single-peaked.
Additive Normal Distribution Signal Structure. Suppose that s i = θ + ν i , where θ and ν i are independent normal random variables, with θ ∼ N (0, σ 2 ) and ν i ∼ N (0, σ 2 ν ). The analysis of Shadmehr and Bernhardt (2011) shows with signal structure A1 is satisfied and ∆ 1 (k) is single-peaked. Here, we show that this signal structure also satisfies A2. Assumption A2. Conditional normal distributions are T P n , n ∈ N (Karlin 1968), and hence are T P 3 . Moreover,
, which is decreasing in θ, (1+e −x ) 2 , where we have normalized the mean to zero without loss of generality and set the scale parameter to 1 to ease exposition.
Because the logistic distribution is logconcave, θ, s 1 and s 2 are affiliated (de Castro 2010).
Assumption A1 (a). Direct calculations show that P r(s j > k|s i ) and E[θ|s j > k, s i ] both have closed-form expressions, and that this assumption holds.
Assumption A1 (b), and the Shape of ∆ 1 (k). We show that, ∆ 1 (k) is single-peaked when w < 1 + µ, and is strictly increasing when w > 1 + µ. To calculate ∆ 1 (k), we condition the terms on θ, and integrate over θ.
We have P r(s j > k|θ) = ∞ k f (s j |θ)ds j = e θ e k +e θ . Using Bayes rule, f (θ|s
Substituting these into equation (18), and integrating yields ∆ 1 (k) = 1 4 k 2 k + 2(µ − w) 4 − e k (2 − k) 2 − k 2 + 3 k + 2(µ − w)
1 − e k + 2 1 − k − (µ − w)
The limiting properties of ∆ 1 (k) as k → ±∞ are revealing about its shape. We have − means that the function approaches its limit from below (it is increasing), and (
− µ) + means that the function approaches its limit from above (it is decreasing).
To see this, suppose k is large enough, and differentiate The asymptotic behavior of ∆ 1 (k) means that when w ≥ 1 + µ, ∆ 1 (k) cannot be singlepeaked-it must either be monotone increasing, or it has at least one maximum and one minimum. From equation (19), note that ∆ 1 (k) and 4(∆ 1 (k) + µ) have the same shape. Let η ≡ µ − w, so that w ≥ 1 + µ corresponds to η ≤ −1, and w < 1 + µ corresponds to η > −1.
From equation (19), Ω(k, η) ≡ 4(∆ 1 (k; η) + µ) = k 2 k + 2η 4 − e k (2 − k) 2 − k 2 + 3 k + 2η 1 − e k + 2
where we make the dependency of ∆ 1 (k) on η explicit. Plotting Ω(k, η) in (k, η) space reveals that ∆ 1 (k) is monotone increasing when η ≤ −1 (i.e., when w ≥ 1 + µ), and that it is single-peaked when η > −1 (i.e., when w < 1 + µ).
Assumption A2. A function f (s i |θ) is T P 3 when s i and θ are affiliated (T P 2 ), and the associated determinant is non-negative for m = n = 3. With an additive logistic signal structure, direct calculations show that this determinant is 24 e 6(s+θ) (e s +e θ ) 12 > 0. Moreover, dLn[P r(k L <s i <k R |θ)] dθ = e (k R +k L ) −e 2θ (e k L +e θ )(e k R +e θ ) decreases in θ, so P r(k L < s i < k R |θ) is logconcave in θ.
Direct calculations show that lim s i →∞ E[θ|s j , s i ]f (s j |s i ) = lim s i →∞ f (s j |s i ) = 0 for a given s j .
Sufficient Conditions for ∆ 1 (k) to be Either Single-peaked or Strictly Increasing.
Suppose P r(s j > k|s i = k) is decreasing in k, P r(s j > k|s i = k) is logconcave in k, and 16 One can also show that lim k→∞ ∆ 1 (k) = ( , which has at most one solution if h(k) and g(k) − w + µ are logconcave.
Therefore, if P r(s j > k|s i = k) is logconcave, and E[θ|s j > k, s i = k] − w + µ is logconcave whenever it is positive, then ∆ 1 (k) = 0 has at most one solution, which must be a maximum.
Thus, ∆ 1 (k) is either strictly increasing or single-peaked.
